

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, "ATOMS FOR PEACE"  
(8 DECEMBER 1953)

Shawn J. Parry-Giles  
University of Maryland

**Abstract:** The Atoms for Peace speech inaugurated a presidential propaganda campaign that remained active for much of Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency. While Eisenhower connected U.S. advancements in atomic energy with peaceful conceptions of science, he simultaneously framed the U.S.S.R.'s scientific advancements with images of fear and apocalypse. Eisenhower's rhetorical focus on the peaceful uses of atomic energy worked to camouflage the administration's military buildup of atomic weaponry, exacerbating the Cold War arms race.

**Key Words:** Dwight D. Eisenhower, Atoms for Peace, Cold War, propaganda, atomic weaponry

As World War II ended and the Cold War dawned, renewed anxieties over peace and war reverberated across the United States and much of the world. Norman A. Graebner explains that the Soviet Union's actions in the aftermath of the Second World War conjured up visions of the "Munich Syndrome," which symbolized the power of Nazism to expand militarily throughout Europe. As a result, the United States and other European nations were inspired to help "prevent further aggression and another world war by turning back the Communist enemy."<sup>1</sup>

In order to meet such new international exigencies, the Eisenhower administration conceived of a global and multiple-year campaign entitled, the Atoms for Peace. The Atoms for Peace speech discussed in this unit inaugurated that long-term propaganda campaign on December 8, 1953, and remained active for much of the remainder of Eisenhower's seven years in office.<sup>2</sup> For Eisenhower, the theme of peace was central to his political career that commenced in the earliest years of the cold war. In 1952, for example, promises of peace dominated Eisenhower's presidential campaign. Once the general became president in 1953, he selected the United Nations (UN), an international symbol of peace, as a stage to deliver his Atoms for Peace speech to a world audience. And, most significantly for this essay, Eisenhower connected his own nation's advancements in atomic energy with peaceful conceptions of science, framing the USSR's scientific advancements, conversely, with images of fear and apocalypse. In the end, Eisenhower's focus on the peaceful uses of atomic energy worked to camouflage the administration's military buildup of atomic weaponry, exacerbating the mutual arms race with the Soviet Union. Even though the cold war has ended, the

legacy of the Atoms for Peace campaign and the nuclear arms race lives on as many more countries struggle to possess nuclear capability. Before turning to an analysis of the speech, however, I will first address Eisenhower's background and the larger cold war context that gave rise to the Atoms for Peace speech.

### *Eisenhower's Rise to Prominence*

Dwight David Eisenhower was born on October 14, 1890, in Denison, Texas, to Ida and David Eisenhower. When Dwight Eisenhower was only one year of age, his family moved to Abilene, Kansas, which is the site of his boyhood home and his presidential library and museum. In 1911, Eisenhower began his college education at the United States Military Academy. By 1915, Eisenhower graduated from West Point and began his career as an Army officer. He married Mamie Geneva Doud the following year.

Eisenhower's career in the military helped propel him to the presidency. During World War I, he served at an army training post near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. He expanded his military schooling in the 1920s by completing Command and General Staff school in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. From 1929-1933, he served as assistant executive to the Office of Assistant Secretary of War. Prior to America's entrance into World War II, Eisenhower acted as General Douglas MacArthur's assistant in the Philippines and also served as a speechwriter in this post—skills he would bring with him to the presidency.<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower's belief in the power of words also is reflected in his support of propaganda and psychological warfare as a means to forestall war. Toward that end, C.D. Jackson served as Eisenhower's psychological warfare expert in North Africa during his tenure as General of the European Theater of Operations.<sup>4</sup> From that position, Eisenhower led the D-Day invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944. In 1948, Eisenhower retired from active duty and served as president of Columbia University. Even though he was urged to run for president of the United States in 1948, he declined the invitation. In 1950, President Truman selected Eisenhower to serve as commander of the NATO forces in Europe, which is where he resided when his 1952 presidential campaign bid was launched.<sup>5</sup>

As Eisenhower continued his work with NATO, his name was placed on the ballot of several Republican primaries as surrogates campaigned for him against primary opponents, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, and former governor of Minnesota, Harold Stassen. In a close primary battle,<sup>6</sup> Eisenhower, a candidate who exhibited characteristics of the Cincinnatus figure that reluctantly and selflessly responded to the call of duty,<sup>7</sup> defeated the popular Taft and Stassen. Eisenhower and Richard Nixon, his vice presidential nominee, went on to defeat the democratic candidate, Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, collecting 442 electoral votes to Stevenson's 89.<sup>8</sup> With that victory, Eisenhower became the first Republican to win a presidential election since 1928. Of Eisenhower's victory, Stephen E. Ambrose writes:

He was in that position because of his proved competence as a general, as a statesman, and as a leader. People had turned to Eisenhower not so much

because of what he stood for . . . but because of who he was and what he had accomplished. He was the hero who could be trusted to lead the nation to peace and prosperity.<sup>9</sup>

The central image that Eisenhower presented of himself was that of a "military hero who is a soldier of peace," Fred I. Greenstein contends.<sup>10</sup> Eisenhower, thus, promulgated a commitment to *peace* during his campaign for the presidency, a theme that he continued to develop as the 34<sup>th</sup> president of the United States.<sup>11</sup>

### *The Early Years of the Cold War*

Eisenhower delivered his "Atoms for Peace" speech on December 8, 1953, to the United Nations General Assembly. In initiating the Atoms for Peace campaign, the speech defined the key rhetorical characteristics of the Eisenhower administration's cold war against Soviet communism, centering specifically on questions of nuclear proliferation, disarmament, and the development of atomic energy. As Martin J. Medhurst asserts, the "Atoms for Peace" speech and its subsequent campaign were a "carefully designed—and highly successful—component of the basic defense and foreign policy stance of the Eisenhower administration."<sup>12</sup>

The year 1953 represented a tension-filled period in the cold war; the Eisenhower administration responded to the exigencies both publicly and privately. On March 6, 1953, Joseph Stalin's death was announced to the world. As the leader of the Soviet Union and General Secretary of the Communist Party's Central Committee, his passing was viewed as an opportunity for the United States to take advantage of a Soviet transfer of power and address fears about nuclear proliferation. In response to Stalin's death, President Eisenhower delivered his famous "Chance for Peace" address on April 16, 1953, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Assessing this speech, Ira Chernus suggests that it "identified the Soviet Union as the sole source of nuclear threat."<sup>13</sup> In the aftermath of the "Chance for Peace" speech, the Eisenhower administration privately planned "Operation Candor," which was designed to tell the truth to the American people about the increasing dangers of atomic weapons and the escalating cold war with the Soviet Union. The Eisenhower administration often referred to this period as an "Age of Peril."<sup>14</sup>

Fears were also mounting among the American people over the intensification of the cold war. In April of 1953, the Vietminh invaded northern Laos as the French stronghold in the region deteriorated. The July 27, 1953, Armistice Agreement left a divided Korea; the war thus failed to create a unified Korea devoid of communist infiltration.<sup>15</sup> In a matter of weeks, the Soviet Union had also tested its first hydrogen bomb. And because the Soviet Union was nearing the "capacity for delivering a hydrogen bomb,"<sup>16</sup> the Eisenhower administration wanted to address simultaneously the increased levels of fear domestically while responding strategically to the Soviets' scientific and military advancements. As the Eisenhower administration stepped up its cold war strategizing, the goals of Operation Candor were eventually folded into the Atoms for Peace campaign. The first of eleven major drafts of the "Atoms for Peace"

speech was produced on November 3, 1953, over a month before President Eisenhower delivered the final version to the United Nations. In part, the speech targeted the American people, preparing them for a protracted cold war against the USSR. Yet, it also targeted international audiences; Eisenhower sought to combat Soviet propaganda and scientific advancements while attracting allies for his nation's battle against communism.

Because of the international aims of the speech, the newly established United Nations was selected as the location for the "Atoms for Peace" address. The UN was created on October 24, 1945, representing some 50 countries initially. Those countries that were most involved in creating the UN charter included China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—popularly known as the "Big Five."<sup>17</sup> The Eisenhower administration recognized the UN as a "symbolic promise of a better, more peaceful world."<sup>18</sup> Before becoming president, Eisenhower supported the creation of the UN, believing that a multi-national security system could serve as a powerful force in the preservation of peace. Eisenhower also believed that the United States should assume a leadership role within the UN. Yet as the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated, conflict also erupted among the Big Five members of the UN, leading Eisenhower to conclude that the world was divided into totalitarian and democratic nations, which eroded the president's faith in this global organization. As a result, Eisenhower grew more cautious of the UN's role internationally. Other U.S. political leaders were even more opposed to the country's membership in an international institution that seemingly privileged global peace over matters of national security and autonomy.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, because the UN came of age during the war of words, it played a key role within that protracted war, explaining Eisenhower's selection of the UN as the site of his Atoms for Peace speech.

### *Eisenhower's Conception of Peace*

Even though Dwight Eisenhower had only been in office for less than one year, his administration had already devoted considerable time to creating a broad-based and multi-faceted campaign that would help the United States achieve the psychological edge over the Soviet Union in the war of words. Not surprisingly, the concept of peace served as the centerpiece of this propaganda campaign in much the same way that it represented a key rhetorical focus of his presidential bid. In part, the sophistication of this campaign of peace and science is evidenced in the careful administrative planning that took place in advance of December 8, 1953. Yet, an examination of the speech also clearly demonstrates the rhetorical complexities at work in the Eisenhower administration's conceptions of peace and atomic energy—conceptions which aimed to put the Soviet Union on the defensive psychologically and militarily.

Like most major presidential speeches of the twentieth century at least, the "Atoms for Peace" speech went through multiple reiterations that involved a myriad of speech writers and advisors. The question of ghostwriting and presidential speechmaking has occupied the attention of many scholars; Medhurst contends that most believe a president is always "responsible for the speech as delivered," regardless

of who writes it.<sup>20</sup> One primary speechwriter of the "Atoms for Peace" address was Eisenhower's World War II aide, C.D. Jackson, who now functioned as Special Assistant to the President for cold war strategy. Other key contributors to the speech included Lewis Strauss, Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's national security advisor. Eisenhower, though, was commonly involved in drafting his own speeches. As Charles J. G. Griffin argues, Eisenhower was both "willing and well qualified to involve himself in the speechwriting process."<sup>21</sup> With the "Atoms for Peace" address, Eisenhower edited speech drafts closely, adding three full paragraphs penned in longhand to draft number five in particular. Medhurst emphasizes how Eisenhower's editing was significant, as the Atoms for Peace speech "takes on a much more conciliatory tone and the themes of peace and hope, always present, come into prominence."<sup>22</sup> The focus, thus, shifted away from a more strident "rhetoric of fear" and highlighted the theme of peace, which was much more consistent with what J. Michael Hogan contends was "Eisenhower's personality and rhetorical persona."<sup>23</sup>

With the final version that was delivered at the UN General Assembly, the Eisenhower administration sought to fulfill multiple goals, reflecting the culmination of the Chance for Peace campaign, Operation Candor, Age of Peril themes as well as the Atoms for Peace campaign, targeting both domestic and international audiences. Chernus suggests that Eisenhower himself acknowledged, "the purpose was hardly single and straightforward," noting multiple goals for the speech. One goal was to convince the USSR to work toward disarmament while encouraging other countries as well as American citizens that the development of peaceful atomic energy was desirable and productive, especially under the leadership of the United States government.<sup>24</sup> In addition, as I have argued elsewhere, the Eisenhower administration sought "an international license to engage in atomic testing—a license that was limited to one superpower—the United States of America." The justification for inhibiting a Soviet-directed atomic energy and testing program was grounded in the belief that the United States represented the country most committed to peace instead of war. Throughout the speech, Eisenhower urged that the Soviet gestures toward peace be viewed suspiciously.<sup>25</sup> The Eisenhower administration, thus, wanted the speech and the subsequent campaign to improve the standing of the United States in its cold war against the Soviet Union, which would ultimately lead to the eventual defeat of communism worldwide.<sup>26</sup> These goals would not be easily achieved, however, especially since the United States was the only country to use atomic weapons against an enemy nation (in its battle against Japan during World War II).

To achieve such ends, of course, the theme of "peace" was accentuated throughout; in fact, Eisenhower used the term "peace" 24 times in the speech. Yet in the process of accentuating themes of peace, Eisenhower's speech also featured a clear warning of imminent danger. Medhurst contends that Eisenhower wanted to "warn the Russians against nuclear attack on the United States," which is why he featured "the warning" in the opening sections rather than burying it "in the midst of an historical narrative."<sup>27</sup> This punctuation of a rhetoric of peace with open threats of retaliation leads Chernus to identify what he believes are contradictory assumptions embedded in Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace logic. While Eisenhower called for mutual cooperation, he

also expected total victory in the cold war against communism. While Eisenhower sought to wage a "global cold war against Communism," he also "promoted peace" as the ultimate end. Despite the perceived inconsistencies, Chernus concludes that Eisenhower believed the United States "could vigorously wage cold war and pursue peace simultaneously, through the same policies."<sup>28</sup>

One way in which peace was inculcated in Eisenhower's speech is through the use of light and dark archetypal metaphors. Michael Osborn argues that such metaphors are "grounded in prominent features of experience, in objects, action, or conditions which are inescapably salient in human consciousness."<sup>29</sup> Metaphors of light framed images of the United States as dark metaphorical images heightened the fear of a USSR-directed atomic energy program. Eisenhower argued:

So my country's purpose is to help us move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light, to find a way by which the minds of men, the hopes of men, the souls of men, everywhere, can move forward toward peace and happiness and well-being. (35)<sup>30</sup>

Even though the Soviet Union was not explicitly identified in this passage, the "dark chamber of horrors" implied the frightening state of affairs with America's cold war nemesis testing a hydrogen bomb.

In order to gain the support of American allies, Eisenhower accentuated the global nature of the threat brought about by nuclear development, which necessitated that a country of peace assumes control over such nuclear proliferation. He spoke metaphorically and fearfully of how the "*dread secret*, and the *fearful images of atomic might*, are not ours alone" (21). More positively, he acknowledged that Great Britain and Canada were also using their "scientific genius" in advancing "our America's original discoveries and the designs of atomic bombs" (22). Eisenhower, cautioned, though, that "The secret is also known by the Soviet Union" (23), which has "exploded a series of atomic devices" (24). The fear surrounding the expansion of nuclear capability was most reserved for a Soviet-inspired atomic program, which now possessed the "dread secret," Eisenhower warned. Reiterating America's scientific prowess, Eisenhower assured his audience that "My country wants to be constructive, not destructive" (34) in its scientific development of atomic energy, implying, accordingly, that the Soviet Union was the country most likely to use such advancements for destructive purposes.

Throughout the speech, Eisenhower also often used implied arguments. Medhurst asserts, "the evolution of the speech drafts from early October to early December evidences a shift away from straightforward assertion to implicative argumentation." Medhurst offers the following examples:

*Explicit Argument #1:*

"Today, the United States' stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that

came from every plane and every gun in every theater of war in all of the years of World War II" (18).

*Implicit Argument #1:*

"Be assured that we are not reducing our weapons program despite reported cutbacks in the defense budget. We are building more nuclear weapons every day and will continue to do so as long as we must."

*Explicit Argument #2:*

"Our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage" (25).

*Implicit Argument #2:*

"You may have enough nuclear devices to hurt us, but we have a lot more and can outlast you in any nuclear exchange."

Such implicit warnings of U.S. nuclear capability and strength, thus, were framed with a rhetoric of peace. Medhurst concludes that this strategy was "conscious and intentional" as Jackson and Strauss wanted to "retain the threat of retaliation while, at the same moment, couching that threat in a language that becomes successively less confrontative."<sup>31</sup> While this speech alone captured domestic and international attention, such arguments and strategies were simultaneously promulgated by multiple administration officials and organizations through an intricate and expansive campaign. Eisenhower's message of America's scientific promises of peace and science stood in sharp contrast with the apocalyptic images of Soviet science, which epitomized the larger rhetorical framework for his administration's battle against communism.

### *The Legacy of the "Atoms for Peace" Speech*

As already mentioned, the "Atoms for Peace" address was part of a larger campaign that lasted throughout the remainder of Eisenhower's presidency. Eisenhower himself believed that "full understanding of the speech by the American people" would "depend on maximum repetition of the principal points over a period of several months."<sup>32</sup> Domestically, over 500,000 pamphlets entitled *The Atoms for Peace and Progress*, were distributed, containing a copy of Eisenhower's speech and photographs.<sup>33</sup> An *Atomic Power for Peace* action kit was also disseminated nationally to key federal employees, the news media, civic organizations, and religious groups. It contained background information, the speech, pictures, and pamphlets.<sup>34</sup> Eisenhower's 1954 "State of the Union Address" as well as his 1954 budget message furthered the Atoms for Peace themes, and other cabinet officials spread out across the country championing Eisenhower's message of peace. An Atoms for Peace postage stamp was even distributed by the U.S. postal service during Eisenhower's presidency.<sup>35</sup>

Atoms for Peace themes were also promulgated to international audiences in the months following the December 1953, address. Moments after it was delivered, the

speech was translated and re-aired over numerous radio stations like the Voice of America, which was part of the United States Information Agency (USIA), as well as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.<sup>36</sup> Films like *Blessing of Atomic Energy* were also made that demonstrated the relationship between the atom and agriculture, medicine, and physics.<sup>37</sup> And the USIA-sponsored magazine, *Problems of Communism*, devoted numerous articles to the Atoms for Peace campaign. As with Eisenhower's address, these materials equated peace and science with the United States while situating Soviet peace and science in a context of fear and suspicion.<sup>38</sup>

Many scholars have assessed the impact of the Atoms for Peace campaign. Greenstein calls the address "one of the rhetorical landmarks of Eisenhower's eight years in office."<sup>39</sup> Attending to the influence of the themes of peace on international and domestic publics, Medhurst argues that Eisenhower's speech helped elevate "the hope of turning weapons into plowshares."<sup>40</sup> The campaign also allegedly influenced those countries dominated by communism. As Walter L. Hixon explains, the campaign "unnerved the Kremlin, and often achieved the desired effect of spurring unrest behind the Iron Curtain."<sup>41</sup> The Eisenhower administration's own evaluation team, the Sprague committee, suggested that the Atoms for Peace campaign "contributed greatly to the positive image of the United States as a peace-keeping nation."<sup>42</sup>

Scholars have continued to acknowledge the seemingly incompatible goals of the campaign. Despite such noted contradictions, Chernus suggests that "No media analyses raised the question of how mutual cooperation and total victory could be logically compatible. Since both were laudable goals being pursued by the administration, it was merely assumed that they were compatible." The campaign also worked to help Americans accept "nuclear energy in all its forms, military as well as civilian, as at least a tolerable fact of life." In the end, Chernus argues that the Atoms for Peace campaign reflected "a religious ritual." On one hand, the campaign helped transform the "frightening imagery of the bomb" into "visions of a utopian future." At the same time, the Atoms for Peace campaign "could never escape its apocalyptic matrix. So it was bound to reinforce all the insecurities that the bomb's destructive power had generated."<sup>43</sup>

Yet, as the Eisenhower administration promulgated such peace themes publicly in its discussions of atomic energy, the administration simultaneously continued its expansion of nuclear weaponry, reflecting internally what was referred to as the New Look. Norman Friedman explains that the "New Look largely substituted nuclear-armed U.S. naval forces for troops on the ground," in an attempt to downsize the military while preparing for what some hardliners in the administration feared could be a nuclear showdown with the USSR.<sup>44</sup> Concern over such a nuclear engagement is revealed in the secret communication of the president's planning group, the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), which called for the administration to move away from its commitment to containment to the eventual "extinction" of communism. In its call for a strengthened foreign policy plan, the PSB talked of an "unequivocal pronouncement for the eventual *extinction* of world communism," a mindset that is arguably exhibited in the administration's nuclear proliferation. While such an atomic war never materialized, the nuclear mindset remains a visible legacy of Eisenhower's New Look. Such military



machinations were in part masked by a campaign that championed the administration's peaceful uses of atomic energy. As the PSB concluded, the administration had to be "prepared to use every means," including "force of arms as well as deception,"<sup>45</sup> perpetuating an on-going nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union.

Such an "apocalyptic matrix" that Chernus talks about persisted throughout the cold war and even into the post-cold war period. On one hand, Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, and Reagan in particular expended large sums of resources to either developing nuclear weaponry or the science to advance the country's nuclear program, creating the U.S. military's capability "to deploy a massive array of fire power to distant portions of the globe within days."<sup>46</sup> At the same time, however, they also worked to institute test ban treaties with the USSR and/or initiated talks to help ensure that such weapons were never used but acted instead as a deterrent against their use by other countries.<sup>47</sup> Not unexpectedly, other countries moved to gain such capability, recognizing the force and threat of nuclear proliferation. In part, the United States went to war against Iraq in 2003, for example, because Saddam Hussein had allegedly acquired the materials necessary to create more long-range nuclear missiles. Anxiety over North Korea's nuclear weapons program also is the subject of considerable debate in the East and the West. And still other countries like China, India, and Pakistan possess nuclear programs while Iran is working toward such nuclear proficiency. Even with the cold war's demise, worries persist over how the United States and Russia are managing their nuclear arsenals; fears also mount over the ability of terrorists to access such nuclear weaponry sites in both countries. Thus, even though the Atoms for Peace campaign represents one of many important rhetorical cold war relics, the practices that it masked and the policies that it justified persist as a constant reminder of the enduring obstacle of preserving peace while simultaneously preparing for war in the nuclear age.

---

Shawn J. Parry-Giles is an Professor of Communication, Director of the Center for Political Communication and Civic Leadership, and Affiliate Professor of Women's Studies at the University of Maryland. She would like to thank the archivists of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library for their research support. She would also like to thank Martin J. Medhurst for his guidance on the unit. And, she would like to thank Belinda Stillion Southard for her editing work on the manuscript.

---

#### Notes

1 Norman A. Graebner, "Myth and Reality: America's Rhetorical Cold War," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, edited by Martin J. Medhurst and H.W. Brands (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 33.

2 Within this essay, I refer to the Atoms for Peace campaign as an act of propaganda. In using this term, I do not mean to imply that the campaign was full of lies and deceit. Rather, I use the term in a way that reflects the Truman and Eisenhower

administrations' conception of propaganda as a key component of U.S. foreign policy in the country's cold war battle with the Soviet Union. Toward that end, the administrations drew on multiple communication channels that targeted international and domestic audiences in their dissemination of coordinated message campaigns to hasten the demise of communism.

3 Charles J. G. Griffin, "Dwight D. Eisenhower: The 1954 State of the Union Address as a Case Study in Presidential Speechwriting," in *Presidential Speechwriting: From the New Deal to the Reagan Revolution and Beyond*, edited by Kurt Ritter and Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2003), 79.

4 Chester J. Pach, Jr., and Elmo Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 38; and Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 94.

5 For background information on Eisenhower, see: Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995); Robert F. Burk, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Hero and Politician* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1986); Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963); Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, eds., *Reevaluating Eisenhower: Americans Foreign Policy in the Fifties* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989); and Pach, Jr. and Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower*.

6 Kathleen E. Kendall reports that Taft won six primaries and Eisenhower won five. Both also had support among the Republican Party leadership. In the end, Eisenhower received the nomination at the Republican National Convention during a period where party leadership often prevailed over primary outcomes. See *Communication in the Presidential Primaries: Candidates and the Media, 1912-2000* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 18-21.

7 Wayne Fields, *Union of Words: A History of Presidential Eloquence* (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 28.

8 Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952, Volume I* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1983), 571.

9 Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 572.

10 Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 96.

11 See Martin J. Medhurst, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Strategic Communicator* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993).

12 Martin J. Medhurst, "Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony: The Rhetorical Structure of a Cold War Campaign," *Armed Forces & Society* 23 (1997): 571-572.

13 Ira Chernus, *Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace* (College Station: Texas A&M University, 2002), 12.

14 J. Michael Hogan, "The Science of Cold War Strategy: Propaganda and Public Opinion in the Eisenhower Administration's 'War of Words,'" in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, edited by Martin J. Medhurst and H. W. Brands (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 154-155.

15 Caroline Pruden, *Conditional Partners: Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the Search for a Permanent Peace* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1998), 92, 100.

16 Martin J. Medhurst, "Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' Speech: A Case Study in the Strategic Use of Language," *Communication Monographs* 54 (1987): 206.

17 Norman Friedman, *The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 31.

18 Pruden, *Conditional Partners*, 16.

19 Pruden, *Conditional Partners*, 16-17.

20 Martin J. Medhurst, "Ghostwritten Speeches: Ethics Isn't the Only Lesson," *Communication Education* 36 (1987): 242. See also Griffin, "Dwight D. Eisenhower," 79.

21 Griffin, "Dwight D. Eisenhower," 86.

22 Medhurst, "Ghostwritten Speeches," 241-249.

23 Hogan, "The Science of Cold War Strategy," 158.

24 Chernus, *Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace*, 96.

25 Shawn J. Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 162-165.

26 See Chernus, *Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace*, 96; and Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War*, 157-172.

27 Medhurst, "Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' Speech," 208.

28 Chernus, *Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace*, 4.

29 Michael Osborn, "Archetypal Metaphor in Rhetoric: The Light-Dark Family," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 53 (1967): 116.

30 Here and elsewhere passages in "Atoms for Peace" are cited with reference to paragraph numbers in the text of the speech that accompanies this essay.

31 Medhurst, "Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' Speech," 208-211.

32 C.D. Jackson to Department and Agency Information Centers, January 19, 1954, White House Central Files, 1953-1961, Confidential File, Box 13, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (hereafter cited as DDEPL), 1.

33 Operations Coordinating Board Minutes, January 19, 1954, White House Central Files, 1953-1961, Confidential File, Box 13, DDEPL, 1-2.

34 *Atomic Power for Peace*, Background and Action Kit No. 24, n.d., White House Central Files, 1953-1961, Confidential File, Box 13, DDEPL.

35 Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*, 165.

36 Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were secretly-sponsored radio stations by the United States government that featured indigenous people from the target countries in Europe broadcasting messages that accentuated U.S. foreign policy news and information. See Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000); and George R. Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

37 "Summary of Events Planned for Exploitation: President Eisenhower's Speech before the UN, December 8, 1953," February 17, 1954, White House Central Files, 1953-1961, Confidential File, Box 13, DDEPL, 1-5.

38 Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*, 169.

39 Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*, 181.

40 Medhurst, "Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' Speech," 218.

41 Walter H. Hixson, *Parting the Iron Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1998), 223.

42 President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad: Conclusions and Recommendations, December 1960, Eisenhower: Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Administrative Series, Box 33, DDEPL, 21-22.

43 Chernus, *Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace*, 120-126.

44 Friedman, *Fifty Year War*, 197.

45 See "Notes for a General Policy Approach to the Lodge Project," July, 1953, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1953-1961, PSB Central Files Series, Box 23, DDEPL, 1-15; and Psychological Strategy Board, August 26, 1953, Policy Paper for the Lodge Project, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-1961, OCB Secretariat Series, Lodge's Human Rights Project, Box 4, DDEPL, 1-25.

46 Jon Western, *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 1.

47 For a more in-depth discussion of deterrence as a key ingredient of U.S. foreign policy during the cold war, see G. Thomas Goodnight, "Ronald Reagan's Re-formulation of the Rhetoric of War: Analysis of "Zero Option," "Evil Empire," and "Star Wars" Addresses," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 72 (1986): 390-414.